Commentary: Observations on the Study of Legal Education—Circa 1980 by Curtis, Thomas B.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 59 
Issue 3 Legal Education 
January 1981 
Commentary: Observations on the Study of Legal 
Education—Circa 1980 
Thomas B. Curtis 
Curtis and Crossen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Legal Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas B. Curtis, Commentary: Observations on the Study of Legal Education—Circa 1980, 59 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 721 (1981). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTARY
OBSERVATIONS ON THE STUDY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION-CIRCA 1980
THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. CURTIS*
I have chosen the word "observations" to describe this paper, but in
spite of good intentions it is more likely a polemic. This may be just as
well, for both our legal system and our doctoral system have been well
served by adversarial methodology in arriving at the truth. The more
pleasant and cooperative consensual approach has its merits, but once
beneath the surface one finds it replete with productive, yet unpleasant,
encounters. As consensus is based upon an already conducted contest,
any resultant analysis is affected by hindsight.
For me to proclaim any partisanship is probably unnecessary, be-
cause my identification as a "politician" makes me suspect from the
outset. In any event, the rhetoric I use will reveal, rather than conceal,
the bias. But I feel the better for the confession, and it may nudge
other contestants to doff the camouflage of "reporter" or "professor"
and show their true colors.
I have reached a number of controversial assumptions about the
practice, the teaching, and the study of law in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury America. While each assumption should be fully supported by
facts and fair arguments, a commentary of short length on a subject this
broad will not so permit. Consequently, what follows will be more of
an outline than a discussion in depth on any one of the topics. How-
ever, I stand ready to back up each assumption set forth. The assump-
tions have not been reached through whimsy, but through long labor in
the vineyard (the legal laboratories) and constant cogitation.
1. Law is learned more by experiencing than by teaching.
This assumption is not to the discredit of pedagoguery. On a time
* B.A., Dartmouth College, 1932; J.D., Washington University, 1935. Mr. Curtis served in
the United States House of Representatives from 1940 until 1974. In 1975, he became the first
Chairman of the Federal Election Commission. He is currently a partner in the firm of Curtis and
Crossen in Clayton, Missouri.
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basis alone, three years in law school in contrast to forty years in prac-
tice, the laboratory has a great edge over the lectern.
2. Law (government) is measured by voluntary observance.
A great deal, if not by far the most, of human activity going on in
any society is individual, requiring not compulsion but, rather, group
cooperation through mutual understanding. In doing the research for
Refections on Voluntary Compliance under the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act' I was amazed to find that the rubric "voluntary" or its
equivalent was for all practical research purposes missing in the many
varied publications on legal words and phrases and in the indexes to
legal reference works, periodicals, text books, case books, and anno-
tated statutes. By contrast, the words "voluntary compliance" or their
equivalent are found frequently in the statutes of the federal govern-
ment and its fifty states.
This indicates to me a grave lack of understanding on the part of the
legal scholars and teachers of the limited role government (legislative,
executive, judicial, and administrative) should play in a society. It also
reveals a basic prejudice on their part to make "government" synony-
mous with "society." And yet government can encourage voluntary
compliance on the part of the citizenry through the neutral role of um-
pire while the participants in many instances make up the rules to be
applied. In a sense the Law of Merchants and other sets of mores and
customs codified into law are products of such a process. Enforcement
of the federal income tax laws depends more upon voluntary compli-
ance than compulsion. The sense of equality and fairness felt by hon-
est citizens nurtures this enforcement strength, but only so long as the
law (government) can operate effectively to check any erosion of this
voluntary foundation.
3. The teaching of law in our law schools is very narrow.
The legal profession, practitioners, teachers, and scholars are not ad-
equately serving our society as a result of this narrowness. The nation's
"other" 200 law schools have emulated the teaching of law in our
twenty elite schools in part because these elite have produced the ma-
jority of the law professors. This teaching has been limited to the judi-
cial practice of law, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
1. 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 830 (1979).
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practice of law and to the near exclusion of that remarkable hybrid,
administrative law. Yet most of the legal controversies in our society
today, and arguably the more important and far reaching ones, are de-
cided not in the courts but, rather, in the legislative, executive, and ad-
ministrative forums. Scholarship tends to follow what is formally
taught, and what is formally taught tends to be that which has been
researched. Therefore, when the teaching of law is narrow, the scholar-
ship is correspondingly narrow. Where there is practice without broad
scholarship, the goals tend to be short range. Pragmatism, not princi-
ple, prevails, and we have what all lawyers should dread: government
by men, not government by laws.
As the practice of legislative and executive law has increased in im-
portance in our society, the total practice of law has indeed moved
away from principle and toward pragmatism. Yet the practice of legis-
lative and executive law-that is, the administrative law practiced in
the federal "independent" regulatory bodies (arms of the Congress)
and the executive agencies (arms of the Administration)-drew heavily
upon the judiciary for their initial rules of procedure and codes of eth-
ics. The Congress in turn drew heavily upon the judiciary for its initial
writing and subsequent updating of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Furthermore, by providing for judicial review of administrative deci-
sions, there has been constant input from the courts toward perfecting
procedures along the lines of the predilections in judiciary practice.
The legal scholars and teachers have neglected these fields of study,
however, to the extent that insufficient work is being done to apply
principle to their practice. At the same time a "school" of pragmatics
has taken over "teaching" this neglected field to give an unearned re-
spectability and encouragement to those practicing a crude form of
pragmatism devoid of ethics and rationalism.2 Gradually the domi-
nance of this anti-intellectualism is destroying what integrity has been
2. See, e.g., The Reagan Steamroller, NnWSWEEK, May 18, 1981, at 38; A Win for "Blue
Max', id. at 40. This article and its inserted sub-article generally describe the successful lobbying
effort undertaken by the Reagan administration to secure passage of the President's budget plan.
In a 1964 letter to Milton Eisenhower, then Chairman of the Criticial Issues Council of the Re-
publican Citizens Committee, I stated:
We have laws today which forbid the executive department lobbying for legislation with
federal funds. These laws are ignored and sneered at by the Administration and its
backers. Instead of being castigated, those who ignore these laws are praised for their
political astuteness in getting legislation moved through what is pictured by many of our
most distinguished scholars and thought leaders to be a stupid and recalcitrant Congress.
Letter from Congressman Thomas B. Curtis to Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower (June 3, 1964) (on file
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built into the legislative and executive forums and is now moving in to
erode the well-developed integrity of the judicial forums established in
such a painstaking way over the century.
Yet the beauty of American scholarship in the social sciences, as it
branched out from its western European roots, comes from its pragma-
tism, from the close attention the scholars have paid to the laborato-
ries-to the daily living of the men and women composing the society.
This scholarship to a large degree existed outside the teaching institu-
tions.3 The legal teaching institutions have, however, been slow to
identify their true laboratories in legal social science. The one instance
in which they did, through Dean Langdell's genius in understanding
that appellate court decisions were reality and that this material could
be brought into the study of law, was remarkably successful. Ironi-
cally, it was this very success, starving the other components, that con-
tributed to the narrow growth of legal scholarship and legal education.
Returning to the three admittedly generalized assumptions stated
earlier, I will attempt to fashion my "observations" into a modest pre-
scription. The responses to the concerns raised by these assumptions
are obvious. We should draw on experience as teacher to a greater
degree in the preparation of our future lawyers. In providing the neces-
sary exposure to the administrative and regulatory system so dependent
on voluntary compliance, we should insure that the pragmatic employ-
with the Washington University Law Quarterly). The legislation mentioned was first enacted in
1919 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1976).
The scenario behind the passage of the budget bill is an example of the school of crude pragma-
tism to which I refer. Congressmen and congressional committees over the years have spoken
with considerable emphasis about the failure of the executive department either to abide by or to
enforce § 1913, the purpose of which is self-evident. Unfortunately, the reporting profession, a
basic part of representative government, particularly in correcting the grievances of the people in
the legislative forums of government, has espoused this "pragmatic" approach almost to the exclu-
sion of reporting the legislatures as study and deliberative bodies and the political election
processes as rational ones.
The judiciary has also spoken on the issue. See National Ass'n for Community Dev. v. Hodg-
son, 356 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D.D.C. 1973): "Unfortunately, in section 1913 Plaintiffs have
dusted off a statute which because of its obscurity may render impossible a precise judgment
concerning the intent of Congress in passing the legislation. There appears to be no record of
prosecutions under the statute." There is, however, neither obscurity nor ambiguity about the
intent of Congress in passing § 1913. Instead there is neglect. My fear is that this neglect will
continue. My sense is that the law curriculum of our nation's fine institutions of legal learning is,
at the least, one appropriate place to begin a movement in the opposite direction.
3. See generally B. BAiLYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1960); L.
CRmIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 1607-1783 (1979); L. CREMIN,
AMERICAN EDUCATION, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783-1876 (1980).
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ment of "legal laboratories" enhances, rather than detracts, from the
principled, ethical, and rational practice of law.4 Finally, we should
broaden the scope of law teaching to encompass not only the above
mentioned principles, but also to include the vital subject area of legis-
lative law.
The bias I confessed earlier clearly sponsors this final recommenda-
tion, but, interestingly, the bias is itself sponsored by the need that the
recommendation addresses. We must vigorously teach this law, for its
neglect has already prompted a crude pragmatism that only erodes the
principles upon which our legal system should stand.5 As legislators,
we must work hard in making law that speaks to our country's various
needs. As lawyers, we should respect this law and pursue its practice
based on the principled and ethical procedures so aptly developed by
the judiciary. Only by the presentation of these guidelines in a curricu-
lum committed to the inclusion of a legislative law component can we
hope to avoid government by men and promote (return to) government
by laws.
4. To this end, practical or clinical offerings in the administrative law area will employ
experience as an additional teaching resource. The opportunity to instill at the student stage an
integrity-based "code of ethics" into the approach to the practice of this law is also invaluable to
the scheme.
5. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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